Social Control in Applied Social Science: A Study of Evaluative Researchers\u27 Conformity to Technical Norms by Bernstein, Ilene Nagel
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1978
Social Control in Applied Social Science: A Study
of Evaluative Researchers' Conformity to Technical
Norms
Ilene Nagel Bernstein
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons, and
the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernstein, Ilene Nagel, "Social Control in Applied Social Science: A Study of Evaluative Researchers' Conformity to Technical Norms"
(1978). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 2079.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2079
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 7, 24-47 (1978) 
Social Control in Applied Social Science: 
A Study of Evaluative Researchers’ 
Conformity to Technical Norms 
ILENE NAGEL BERNSTEIN 
Indiana University 
This paper is a preliminary exploration of the relationship between social 
factors, and conformity to a set of prescribed methodological norms in applied 
social science. Focusing our attention on evaluative research, we seek to estimate 
how variation in type and nature of research sponsorship, research context, and 
researcher relationships with sponsor and host affect reported conformity to 
methodological prescriptions. Analyzing the self-reported responses of I52 
evaluative researchers to a mail questionnaire, we find: (a) that conformity to 
methodological prescriptions is very variable among evaluative researchers: (b) 
that the social factors here examined seem to affect systematically the degree of 
conformity; (c) that while no single social factor has a large net effect on conform- 
ity, simultaneously occurring values seem more conducive to conformity, i.e., 
characteristics associated with our “academic model” are correlated with re- 
ported higher conformity, whereas characteristics associated with our “entre- 
preneurial model” are correlated with reported lower conformity. Our findings 
suggest that, while traditional social control mechanisms increase the likelihood of 
adherence to methodological prescriptions for those whose work fits or resembles 
the “academic model,” when the model of work moves toward the “entrepreneu- 
rial” type, reported conformity decreases with the absence of those traditional 
mechanisms of social control. Insofar as the “entrepreneurial model” is increas- 
ingly becoming the predominant work model in applied social science, our findings 
suggest that future research should seek to explain variation in conformity among 
the “entrepreneurs” and to explore the variety of means by which to increase 
conformity within this model. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the application of social science to practical problems of 
policy and action is still in its early stages, a large body of 
experience has been accumulated. . . , The experience is there, 
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but it has not been systematically reviewed or codified. Con- 
sequently, no one knows the present status of applied social 
science. . . . (Met-ton, 1949, p. 161). 
According to Merton (1949), one neglected responsibility of social 
science is to study the performance of professional social scientists. As 
part of that study, he suggests we explore the conditions that limit and 
make for achievement. In a way, what Merton was calling for nearly three 
decades ago was the systematic inquiry into the models of social control 
in applied social science.’ Of interest is that Cole and Cole (1973, pp. l-7), 
in reviewing the sociology of science, note that “Interest in the social 
organization of science and the ways in which this organization affects 
scientific development has been slow in coming.” This is especially true 
for the sociology of social science and even more so for the sociology of 
applied social science. 
Kornhauser (1962), Hagstrom (1965), Marcson (1966), Storer (1966), 
Collins (1%8), Boalt (1969), and Blume (1974) have all addressed the 
question of social control in science. Perhaps the most definitive thesis is 
Hagstrom’s (1965) study of conformity to and deviation from norms in 
basic science and the social factors affecting it. Using the concepts of 
socialization, exchange, and social control, Hagstrom (1965, p. 52) ex- 
plains the institution of science as follows: 
The thesis is that social control in science is exercised in an 
exchange system, a system wherein gifts of information are ex- 
changed for recognition from scientific colleagues. Because scien- 
tists desire recognition, they conform to the goals and norms of 
the scientific community. Such control reinforces and compli- 
ments the socialization process in science. . . . 
Importantly, for our purposes, Hagstrom finds evidence to suggest that 
there is substantial variation in the degree to which scientists conform to 
norms, and that certain social factors significantly affect the degree of 
conformity. However, Hagstrom (1965, p. 294) concludes his thesis by 
stating that, to the extent that some groups of scientists may be more 
strongly influenced than others by nonscientists, future research should 
reexamine his thesis. One might argue that Hagstrom’s call for reexamina- 
tion results partly from the fact that Hagstrom believes, as do Bernal 
(1939), Polanyi (1951), and Kuhn (1962), that, as science moves from an 
occupation of curious and ingenious minds supported by wealthy patrons 
to an industry supported largely by the state, there will be an accompany- 
’ According to Hagstrom (1965, p. I), the study of social control in science is a study that 
seeks to determine those factors conducive to conformity to or deviation from scientific 
norms. 
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ing decrease in the influence of scientists on science and a concomitant 
increase in the influence persons external to the scientific community 
have on scientific work. Furthermore, Polanyi (1951), Kuhn (1962), and 
Price (1968) have posited that the increased power the State has over 
scientific work will result in a decreased motivation of scientists to excel. 
Their argument is predicated on the assumption that freedom to select and 
detine one’s own research problem is a central norm of science and the 
primary incentive to do quality work (see also Roe, 1951; Kornhauser, 
1962). 
The pursuit of science can be organized therefore, in no other 
manner than by granting complete independence to all mature 
scientists. . . . The function of public authorities is not to plan 
research, but only to provide opportunities for its pursuit. . . . To 
do less is to neglect the progress of science: to do more is to 
cultivate mediocrity and waste public money (Polanyi, 1951, p. 
90). 
Blume (1974) argues that the question is no longer one of debate, i.e., to 
argue as Polanyi (1951), Price (1968) and others did over whether science 
should be influenced by external forces: instead, the task now is to begin 
to estimate the effects of these external forces. 
Most generally, the research reported herein is addressed to a prelimi- 
nary exploration of the question first raised by Merton (1949), i.e., how do 
social factors limit and make for achievement in applied social science. 
Focusing on the most rapidly expanding form of applied social science 
research, i.e., evaluative research, we examine one aspect of achieve- 
ment: conformity to a set of methodological norms, and how a variety of 
social factors affect such conformity. More specifically and related to 
Blume’s (1974) question, we concern ourselves with the variation on these 
social factors, e.g., whether the research is funded as a result of a 
judgment by a peer review panel, such as in the case of grants, or as a 
result of a judgment by a review not relying on peer scientists, such as in 
the case of contracts, and how the grant/contract difference correlates 
with conformity. The study of evaluative researchers is particularly suited 
to a preliminary exploration of these questions since there is considerable 
variation on the variety of social factors here considered. 
In order, we examine (1) if within this group of funded applied research 
studies, there is substantial systematic variation in conformity to a set of 
prescribed technical norms: (2) if so, can the set of social factors here 
considered account for a significant amount of that variation in conform- 
ity; (3) what is the gross and net effect of each of the social factors on 
conformity; (4) how do variations on the social factors specifically relate 
to conformity: and (5) based on the results, what are the implications for 
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understanding social control in applied social science research. By so 
doing, we hope to lay the groundwork for further research on the sociol- 
ogy of social research, especially the kind of social research that is clearly 
subject to external influences. 
Sample 
DATA AND METHODS 
The sample used for the analyses that follow consists of 152 evaluative 
researchers who received grant or contract support in the amount of 
$10,000 or more, directly from an agency of the federal government, in 
fiscal year 1970, for the purpose of measuring the process (implementa- 
tion) and impact (effect) of a large-scale social action program in one of 
the areas of health, education, welfare, manpower, income security, 
public safety, and/or housing.2 The data come from these researchers’ 
responses to a mail questionnaire. 
The study of evaluative researchers is strategic for addressing the 
questions raised because the proliferation of program evaluation studies 
has been accompanied by an increase in diversity of styles of organizing 
research. Moreover, by limiting our analyses to one kind of applied social 
science research, we can somewhat reduce the amount of variation in 
conformity that might alternatively be explained by a relationship be- 
tween certain types of research problems and adherence to a set of 
methodological prescriptions. As stated above, our sample includes only 
evaluators whose research tasks included the measurement of program 
implementation and program impact: and, this definition of the research 
task was determined both by our screening of proposal abstracts and by 
confirmation by the evaluators that they agreed with this task definition. 
By limiting our sample to evaluators, all of whom received their initial 
funding in the same l-year time frame, we add a measure of control for 
changes in the definition of appropriate methodologies that might result 
* The data on the 152 evaluative researchers are drawn from a larger sample of evaluative 
researchers surveyed as research studies by Bernstein and Freeman (1975). Bernstein and 
Freeman surveyed the total population of evaluation studies first funded by a federal 
agency in fiscal 1970 (N = 382). Of those 382, they report that 83% of the 382 responded to 
their mail questionnaire, netting a sample size of 318. Of the 318 questionnaires returned, 82 
included responses indicating that, despite extensive prescreening, the study named was not 
an evaluative study. Bernstein and Freeman comment upon these 82 cases, but include in 
their analysis only the remaining 236 cases. They further report that their available data on 
respondents and nonrespondents showed no differences between the two groups. Of the 236 
studies included in their review, 152 were comprehensive evnluarions, i.e., evaluative 
studies that included both procedures to measure process (program implementation) and 
impact (program effectiveness). 
Importantly, the analyses and discussion reported here differ significantly from those in 
Bernstein and Freeman (1975) insofar as here we examine data for a subsample and focus 
our attention on a subset of factors selected to address in greater depth the theoretical 
questions posed in our introduction. 
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with the passage of time. Finally, our exclusion of similar studies that 
were unfunded, funded by some agency other than a federal funding 
agency, funded indirectly, or funded with a research budget (independent 
of the program budget) of less than $10,000 was motivated by our concern 
for circumscribing a sample of research studies that were more similar 
than dissimilar to one another, without losing the diversity in social 
factors here examined, the effect of which we wished to track. 
Our study is limited by the fact that we could not make use of an 
experimental design, i.e., we could not persuade the government to agree 
to assign randomly the evaluative studies to a variety of research organi- 
zation conditions. As such, our analyses can only make statements about 
corelationships rather than causal relationships. Moreover, in the absence 
of a true experiment, we cannot control for self-selection effects. While 
we can make some assumptions about their strength as rival hypotheses, 
future research will have to probe more directly into the degree to which 
self-selection alters, modifies, or refutes our findings. These limitations 
not withstanding, we proceed with our presentation, keeping in mind that 
our research is exploratory; nonetheless, it is the first effort to examine 
systematically one aspect of achievement in applied social science re- 
search. 
Measuring Conformity 
According to Merton (1942), Barber (1952), Kuhn (1962), Hagstrom 
(1965), Storer (1966), and Blume (1974), there exists in science a dominant 
set of institutional norms that proscribe and describe appropriate moral 
and technical behavior. While there has been some debate as to the degree 
to which the moral norms actually guide scientists’ attitudes and behavior 
(Mitroff, 1974), that there are a set of agreed-upon prescriptions for 
technical procedures seems not to be challenged.” 
Kuhn (1962, pp. 5-6) argues that normal science rests upon the assump- 
tion that the scientific community shares definitions of appropriate prob- 
lems for study as well as legitimate methods for conducting the various 
studies. In the process of articulating these definitions, a set of standard 
procedures for conducting research is set forth (1962, pp. 27,76). Accord- 
ing to Hagstrom (1%5), Storer (1966), and Blume (1974), scientists con- 
3 This is not to deny that debates over approaches or orientation in science do not occur. 
Rather, it is to accept a Kuhnian (1%2, pp. 37, 76) notion of science that argues that, at any 
particular point in time, there is general consensus about appropriate methodological 
procedures for researching specijc types of scientijk problems. Since we limit ourselves to 
persons conducting comprehensive program evaluations, each seeking to identify the degree 
to which program implementation causes changes on the desired outcome measures, 
it seems appropriate to assume that there is general consensus about prescribed 
methodologies: and, apart from the few dissensions reviewed in Footnote 4, a review of the 
evaluation literature would seem to support such an assumption of consensus. 
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form to these norms because it allows them to continue participation in 
the exchange system whereby competent responses and recognition are 
exchanged for efforts that evidence adherence to methodological norms. 
One way of measuring conformity to technical norms is to select a set of 
norms, to examine adherence to each norm individually, and then to 
construct a composite index and measure the degree of adherence to it. In 
order to determine which norms should be examined and what they 
specifically prescribe as methodologically appropriate, it is necessary to 
examine the methodological literature that sets forth guidelines for 
conducting research. 
A systematic review of the evaluative research literature reveals that 
six basic methodological issues are repeatedly addressed: (1) the method 
used to select the sample population: (2) the type of data analytic tech- 
niques used, e.g., multivariate statistical analysis: (3) the general nature of 
the data analytic process, e.g., quantitative: (4) the type of research 
design, e.g., experimental design: (5) the validity of the measurement 
procedures: and (6) the representativeness of the sample to the appro- 
priate universe. 
Generally, it is asserted that the sample population to be observed 
should be selected as a probability sample (see for example, Suchman, 
1967, pp. 102-103: Anderson, 1975: Bernstein, 1975). By randomly select- 
ing the group(s) to be observed, certain rival hypotheses, e.g., selection 
factors, maturation, become less of a threat to problems of internal 
validity. Second, it is asserted that multivariate statistical procedures 
should be used (see for example Wholey, Scanlon, Duffy, Fukumoto, and 
Vogt, 1970, Chap. 6; Alwin and Sullivan, 1975; Eber, 1975). Insofar as 
evaluative research implies a need for causal analysis, and insofar as 
evaluative researchers can rarely rely on true experimental designs to rule 
out threats to internal validity, multivariate statistical techniques are pre- 
scribed as a substitute in the absence of random assignment of persons to 
control and experimental groups. Third, it is argued that evaluative re- 
search should be predominantly quantitative in terms of the nature of the 
data analytic processes (see for example, Rossi, 1972, pp. 3, 16,46). This 
present preference for quantification may in part be a reaction against the 
qualitative evaluations that dominated until the mid-1960s. As Bernstein 
and Sheldon (1977) note, qualitative methods were often used when the fear 
of a negative evaluation was present, since softer measures could be 
reinterpreted more easily than hard empirical data to cover up for program 
failure. Moreover, the expressed preference for quantitative methods over 
qualitative, or even over part qualitative and part quantitative, stems in 
large part from the fact that: (a) the “ideal” model for evaluative research is 
the experimental model (Riecken and Boruch, 1974); (b) implementing 
such a design, or an approximation of it, e.g., quasi-experimental, requires 
quantitative data analysis; and (c) quantitative analyses are far more 
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readily suited to the making of causal statements. Experimental designs 
focus on the problem of attribution, and attribution implies causality. 
Fourth, with respect specifically to the type of research design, Rossi 
(1972, p. 16) argues, “[The] main methodological model [for evaluative 
research] is the controlled experiment and its derivatives.” Similarly, 
Riecken et al. (1974), Boruch (1974), and others have argued that the 
experimental or quasi-experimental design model is the most desirable 
and appropriate one as long as evaluations seek to demonstrate causality 
(see for example, Campbell, 1971; Cain and Hollister, 1972: Stanley, 
1972).4 Fifth, the importance of reliable and valid measurement proce- 
dures is underscored by Hyman and Wright (1967, p. 743), Suchman 
(1967, p. llO), and Nunnally (1975). Last, it is said that the sample(s) 
observed should be a reasonable sample of the universe to which one 
wants to generalize (see Suchman, 1967: Bernstein, Bohrnstedt, and 
Borgatta, 1975: and Cook and Campbell, 1975). Suchman (1967, p. 103) 
states: “If the results [of the evaluation] are to be meaningful, the group 
one uses in the evaluative project should be representative of the target 
group for the full scale operating program.“5 
Analysis Procedures 
In accordance with the literature review referred to above, a six-item 
index of methodological prescriptions was constructed to serve as the 
dependent variable, i.e., the measure of conformity to basic technical 
norms. To determine the degree of conformity, the evaluative research- 
ers’ responses to questions ascertaining what methodological procedures 
were used were coded for each of six items. The six items include: method 
used for sample selection, type of data analytic techniques used, nature of 
data analyses procedures, type of research design, validity of measure- 
ment procedures, and representativeness of the sample.6 Importantly, 
4 Weiss and Rein (1970) and Edwards, Guttentag, and Snapper (1975) argue that alterna- 
tive approaches, e.g., a decision theoretic approach, may be more useful to evaluation given the 
political context in which it is ordinarily conducted. However, even the critics of the 
experimental model do not reject it so much as they see it as too difficult to implement. The 
fact that Boruch (1974) has mustered substantial evidence to the contrary, i.e., he has 
delimited an extensive list of experiments successfully mounted in evaluative research, 
coupled with the absence of evidence for general acceptance of the decision theoretic 
approach, leads us to conclude that, at this point in time, the general consensus still supports 
the use of the experimental model. 
5 Williams and Evans (1969, pp. 118-132) and Wholey et al. (1970, p. 98) similarly argue 
that the only meaningful evaluations are those executed in program settings representative 
of settings likely to be used for similar programs and on target populations representative of 
likely future target populations. 
6 For example, the questionnaire asked “Does the research plan to measure impact or 
change include an experimental or quasi-experimental design?” and “Instead of or in 
addition to an experimental design, are any of the following approaches utilized? Check all 
that apply: Longitudinal study without control or comparison groups; cross-sectional study 
without control or comparison groups: . .” 
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however, each item was first analyzed separately by means of tabular 
analysis to determine the appropriateness of using a composite index. 
Since the pattern of relationships between each of the independent varia- 
bles-and each of the dependent variables separately was consistent across 
all six dependent variables, it seemed appropriate to create one composite 
index (the construction of the index is explained in detail below). Fur- 
thermore, we computed an (Y measure, according to Bohmstedt (1%9), to 
determine the reliability of the constructed composite index. The (Y for our 
six-item index is .69. 
In order to assign scores to each questionnaire response for each of the 
six items, we referred back to the literature review and rank ordered the 
responses for each item, giving the highest score to the procedure most 
highly recommended and the lowest score to the procedure least recom- 
mended. For example, on the item “research design,” a “3” was as- 
signed to the use of an experimental OR quasi-experimental design with 
both randomization and control groups: a “2” was assigned to the use of 
an experimental OR quasi-experimental design with either randomization 
or control groups; a “1” was assigned to the use of a longitudinal or 
cross-sectional design without a control or comparison group; and, a “0” 
was assigned to the use of descriptive testimony or narratives as the 
research design.7 
To construct the index, each of the six items, i.e., methodological 
procedures, was weighted by l/m-l where m was the number of response 
categories. In this way, each of the six items has equal weight in the 
composite scale. The total score was equal to the sum of the products of 
the response code multiplied by the weight for each item. The total scores 
range from 0 to 6, 6 representing the highest degree of conformity.8 The 
mean score on the index is 4.0: the standard deviation is 1.4. 
To estimate the effects of the social factors on the index of conformity, 
dummy variable regression procedures are used.g To estimate net effects, 
’ An example of a descriptive design is the case of an evaluator who reported measuring 
program impact by asking the program staff to describe the program effects at several points 
during the intervention. An example of a narrative design is the case of an evaluator who 
reported that he observed the program in action and used his own verbal description as 
evidence of program effect. 
’ Using self-reported responses may cause concern about the reliability of such re- 
sponses. However, given that the questionnaire asks “What methodological procedures 
were followed,” and given it is common knowledge that certain procedures are preferred, 
we suggest that, if any bias exists, it is in the direction of inflating the degree of conformity. 
Furthermore, respondents did know that access to materials that would verify or question 
their responses could be made available to us. Thus, we suggest that the likelihood of false 
responses was low. 
’ While some may question the appropriateness of regression analysis with these kind of 
data, the arguments by Cohen (1968) and Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) are quite convinc- 
ing. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the analyses were run using tabular formats too, i.e.. 
each of the independent variables was run against the dependent variable “conformity,” 
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i.e., the amount of unique variance, we deleted, in turn, each set of 
dummy variables used to represent the particular independent variable 
from the full equation. Thus, the net effect is the difference between the 
RZ when all the dummy variables are entered into the equation and the R2 
when the set of dummies for the particular independent variable in qua- 
tion was deleted. 
Independent Variables 
In determining a set of independent variables to consider, our intent 
was to include social factors that tap some aspects of the external influ- 
ence, the kind of which Polanyi (1951), Hagstrom (1965), and Price (1968) 
posited to be likely to affect conformity to scientific norms. Accordingly, 
we examine the effect of each of the following on our measure of conform- 
ity to methodological norms: (1) the federal agency that sponsored the 
evaluator’s research effort, e.g., NIMH, LEAA: (2) the nature of the 
research award given the evaluator, e.g., contract, grant: (3) the amount 
of research funds allocated for the evaluator’s research: (4) the number of 
years for which funding was approved: (5) the type of organization with 
which the evaluative researcher is affiliated, e.g., profit, nonprofit, uni- 
versity; (6) the major audience (as defined by the evaluator) to whom 
research findings are addressed, apart from the research sponsor; (7) the 
formal organizational arrangement between the organization administer- 
ing the social action program being evaluated and the organization with 
which the evaluator is affiliated, e.g., the evaluator is affiliated with the 
same organization as that administering the action program, i.e., the 
evaluator is an inside evaluator; (8) the informal working relationship 
between the evaluation staff administering the action program vis-i-vis 
research decisions, e.g., decisions concerning research design are made 
jointly between the two staffs; and (9) the informal working relationship 
between the staff of the federal agency sponsoring the evaluation and the 
evaluation staff vis-$-vis research decisions.‘O 
once using conformity as a seven-field category (O-6) and once collapsing the categories 
into three groups arbitrarily called high, medium, and low conformity. As expected, the 
results of the tabular analyses using nonparametric tests are identical to those reported for 
the regression analyses. 
‘” It may seem that certain critical variables, although not representative of the kind of 
external influence about which Polanyi was concerned, are left out in our analyses. For 
example, such variables might relate to characteristics about the evaluative researcher. We 
should note here that, in prior analyses. we found that the highest degrees of the evaluators 
as well as their years of research experience had no significant effects on conformity. In fact, 
it was their lack of effect that partly stimulated our interest in homing in on the factors 
considered here. Since our research is exploratory, we suggest that future analyses gather 
more in-depth data on both the characteristics of the researcher as well as the social factors 
considered here so as to allow for a meaningful comparison of their relative effects on 
conformity. 
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Results 
First, in order to determine whether or not there is deviation from the 
index of technical norms, we examined the distribution of scores. Given 
that the norms were described in the literature as basic to any well-done 
evaluation study, ideally, one would expect the majority of scores to be 
near perfect. Our analyses indicate that 11% (iV = 16) of the 152 evaluative 
researchers used all six prescribed methodological procedures, i.e., at- 
tained a score of 6 on our index. Clearly, deviation from technical norms 
is high in evaluative research. If one recalls that our data are based on 
self-reported responses, this finding becomes more significant insofar as if 
the self-reported nature of the data collection is biased, the bias is almost 
certainly in the direction of producing an inflated rather than deflated 
estimate of conformity. 
The finding of substantial deviation from technical norms is consonant 
with the conclusions of those who have previously examined scientific 
research (Hagstrom, 1965) and policy research, e.g., Whyte and Hamilton 
(1%4), Wilkins (1969), Wholey et al. (1970), and Stromsdorfer (1972). 
Wholey et al. (1970), for example, in reviewing evaluative research 
funded by four federal agencies, concluded that few significant program 
evaluations have been undertaken, and most of those carried out were 
poorly conceived, poorly executed, and poorly disseminated. 
Second, in order to determine the degree to which the variation in 
conformity found could be explained by the social factors delimited ear- 
lier, we regressed the index of conformity on the nine factors. The RZ is 
.301, significant at the .OOl level. I1 Thus, we conclude that the social 
factors examined here do have a statistically significant effect on conform- 
ity. 
Third, to estimate the effect of each of the nine factors individually on 
conformity, we regressed the index of conformity on the set of dummy 
variables used to represent each factor. Table 1 presents the gross and net 
effects for each variable. Seven of the nine factors examined have statisti- 
cally significant gross effects on the index of conformity: the amount of 
funds and the working relationship vis-a-vis research decisions between 
the evaluators and the sponsoring agency staff are the two exceptions. 
The net effects, however, are all very sma11.12 This is probably due to the 
fact that no single factor has a large unique net effect on conformity. 
Rather, the variance is shared, and, as will be discussed later, patterns of 
‘I Given the nature of our particular sample, it is not clear that significance tests are 
relevant. However, until the significance test controversy is resolved, we will opt to 
continue to present them. 
‘* While we present the net effects to provide an estimate of the unique variance ex- 
plained, it should be kept in mind that variables can be very important and can have 
nonsignificant net effects because their contribution to the explained variance is shared. 
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TABLE 1 
Gross and Net Effects for Each of the Social 
Factors on the Index of Conformity 
Variable Gross effects Net effects 
Sponsoring agency 
Nature of award 
Amount of funds 
Number of years for award 
Type of organization with which 
researcher is affiliated 
Major audience for findings 
Formal organizational arrangement 
between education and action program 
organizations 
Working relationship between evaluation 
and action staffs re research decisions 
Working relationship between evaluation 
and sponsoring agency staff re research 
decisions 
,0**4* 
,O(jO”” 
.035 
.008 
.032* 
,009 
.055* 
.011 
,002 
,002 
,000 
,005 
‘: Significant at .05. 
i::‘X Significant at .Ol. 
CO* Significant at JO1, 
values occurring simultaneously seem to be more or less conducive to the 
kind of conformity being considered. 
To examine the way in which the specific dummy vairable categories, 
e.g., grant, affect the conformity index, we present the unstandardized 
regression coefficients (Table 2). Given our finding that only two of the 
independent variables have significant net effects, we are not surprised to 
find that few of the regression coefficients are statistically significant. 
While the fact that they are not statistically significant means only that the 
category which the dummy variable represents does not significantly 
differ from the left out category, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no difference. Based on Table 2, we conclude that evaluators funded 
under contract auspices are less likely to conform to methodological 
prescriptions, as are evaluators whose time frame falls between 12 and 18 
months. 
The fact that the total variance explained is .301 and that seven of the 
nine independent variables have statistically significant gross effects, yet 
few variables have significant net effects (and few dummy variables have 
significant regression coefficients) leads us to reiterate our earlier conclu- 
sion that the variance explained is largely shared rather than unique. As 
such, we turn our attention toward a search for patterns of simultaneously 
occurring values that might have some predictive utility and theoretical 
meaning. 
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TABLE 2 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, I Values, and 
Frequencies for Each Category of Each Independent Variable 
Variables Unstandardized t Value Frequency 
regression 
coefficient 
(SE) 
Sponsoring agency” 
NlHlNlMH 
Housing and Urban Development, 
Agriculture, Labor, Office of Economic 
Opportunity 
Oflice of Education or HEW other than NIH, 
NIMH, SRS 
Department of Justice 
Social Rehabilitation Services 
Nature of award 
Grant 
Contract 
Amount of funds 
$150,ooo + 
$ I o,ooo-49,999 
$100,000-149,999 
$50,000-99,999 
Duration of award 
3 years + 
Less than I year 
I .5-2 years 
2-3 years 
l-1.5 years 
Type of organization 
Educational institution or affiliate 
Profit research corporation 
Nonprofit research corporation 
+.026 
(.&O) 
-b 
-.034 
C.408) 
-.I59 
(.558) 
-.360 
(.437) 
- 
- .986 
(.403) 
- 
-.I43 
(.347) 
-.342 
(.349) 
-.355 
(.329) 
- 
-.05l 
(442) 
-.275 
(.361) 
-.349 
(.314) 
-1.007 
(.342) 
+.461 
(.325) 
+.247 
(.367) 
+.236 
(.359) 
.056 30% (45) 
24% (37) 
.084 
.286 
.825 
9% (14) 
22% (34) 
15% (22) 
100% 
2.445 
.4l I 
.980 
I .079 
5% (89) 
41% (63) 
100% 
2% (42) 
25% (36) 
,116 
.762 
I.113 
2.949 
21% (31) 
25% (36) 
100% 
2% (43) 
I I% (17) 
19% (28) 
22% (33) 
20% (30) 
100% 
1.420 
,673 
32% (49) 
28% (42) 
21% (31) 
(Conrinued) 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Variables Unstandardized r Value Frequency 
regression 
coefficient 
(SE) 
Public service or planning agency - 
Major audiencec 
Cosmopolitan 
Local 
Formal organizational arrangement 
Evaluator “inside” 
Evaluator “outside” 
Working relationship between evaluator and 
action 
Action staff review decisions about research 
made by the evaluator 
Evaluator and action staff make decisions 
about research jointly 
Evaluator makes decisions about research 
independent of the action staff 
Working relationship between evaluation and 
sponsoring agency 
Sponsor makes research decisions independent 
of evaluator 
Sponsors review decisions about research 
made by evaluator 
Evaluator makes decisions about research 
independent of sponsor 
Evaluator and sponsoring staff make decisions 
about research jointly 
Intercept = 4.538. 
+.I98 
(.281) 
- 
+.204 
(.330) 
- 
-t.o39 
(.305) 
+ .036 
C.305) 
- 
+.25g 
c.502) 
+.I58 
c.272) 
- 
-.095 
C.345) 
,705 
,618 
.I29 
.I 17 
,515 
S3l 
.273 
20% (30) 
100% 
30% (45) 
70% (106) 
100% 
41% (63) 
59% (89) 
100% 
23% (34) 
44% (67) 
33% (50) 
100% 
5% (8) 
38% (58) 
40%, (60) 
17% (26) 
106% 
D Agencies were grouped together on the basis of similar operating practices and similar 
missions. 
b Left-out category. 
c Major audience was defined as “cosmopolitan” if the respondents indicated that they 
did or intend to maximize communication with other colleagues and researchers and to 
publish the results in journals and/or monographs. If  the respondent indicated otherwise, 
e.g., communication would be maximized with government officials and results would be 
disseminated in government reports, the response for audience was classified as “local.” 
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An examination of a correlation matrix for each of the response 
categories reveals two interesting patterns. The first is one of awards 
funded by research oriented agencies, e.g., NIMH, in the form of grants, 
for 3 or more years, to evaluators in educational institutions who define 
their major audience as cosmopolitan, who work as “insiders,” and who 
make research decisions jointly with the staff of the action program (see 
Table 3).13 The second is one of awards funded by service-oriented agen- 
TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix of Response Categories for Academic-Type Group0 
$50-99 on funds (I)” 
NIH/NlMH spon- 
sored (2) 
Grant (3) 
3+ years (4) 
Evaluator in educa- 
tional institution (5) 
Cosmopolitan 
audience (6) 
“Inside” evaluator (7) 
Evaluator and action 
staff make joint 
research decisions (8) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
- 
2, ‘-:: - 
II 4 , ‘” 1: a _ 
00 28:““:‘; 26”Z:::: _ 
03 32*** 29*** l7** - 
11 37*** 35*** 35*** 21** - 
11 a*** 45*** 26*** ,3* 26*** - 
12 28*** 33*** 21** 18** 16* f&-j*** - 
o The variable “working relationship between sponsor and evaluator” is not included 
because there is no clear pattern of association between any particular response on that 
variable and these other response categories. While the same is true of the variable “budget 
size,” it is presented here as an item of possible interest. 
* Budget is in thousands. 
“p < .0.5. 
::::: p < ,o,. 
:.:j’:::; p < JO,, 
ties, e.g., SRS, in the form of contracts, for 12 to 18 months, to evaluators 
in profit research corporations who define their major audience as locals, 
who work “outside,” and who make research decisions independent of the 
staff administering the action program (see Table 4). For convenience sake, 
we label the first group the “academic model,” and the second, the “en- 
trepreneurial model.” 
To determine whether a comparison of these two model types provides 
insight into our understanding of conformity, we computed a predicted 
I3 The amount of funds allocated for the research and the relationship between the 
sponsoring agency and the evaluation staff regarding research decisions are not included in 
the discussion since neither variable was found to have a significant gross effect on conform- 
ity. 
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TABLE 4 
Correlation Matrix of Response Categories for Entrepreneur-Type Group” 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
$l50+ funds ( I)b - 
Sponsor: HUD, AG, 
OEO, Labor (2) 35*** - - 
Contract (3) 2f+*** fjo*** 
l-l.5 years (4) -14* -06 15* - 
Evaluator in profit 
research corpora- 
tion (5) 24*** 37*** 47*** IS** - 
Local audience (6) II 28”“” 352?‘* 08 28”““: _ 
“Outside” evaluator (7) 12 28”“:“: 45”*” ,2 36”“:” 2(j**::’ _ 
Evaluator makes research 
decisions independent 
of action staff (8) IO 15* 2,“” 04 2oL’* 14” jg**r: _ 
u The variable “working relationship between sponsor and evaluator” is not included here 
for reasons cited in the note in Table 3. 
b Budget is in thousands. 
*p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
***p < .ool. 
mean score for each pattern by adding the regression constant, i.e., 4.54, 
to the unstandardized regression coefficient for each response category 
(dummy variable) named above. The predicted mean for the “academic 
type” is 5.47; the predicted mean for the “entrepreneurial type” is 2.43. 
This difference suggests that these ideal-type patterns are correlated with 
conformity, and that the academic-type model is more conducive to the 
likelihood that there will be adherence to technical norms. 
DlSCUSSlON 
In order to explore why it is that evaluations more closely fitting the 
“academic type” are correlated with reported higher conformity to meth- 
odological prescriptions, we organize our discussion around a considera- 
tion of each of the categories included in that model type. Importantly, 
however, one must keep in mind the fact that few of these categories have 
unique effects on conformity. 
Beginning with the sponsoring agency, from Table 1 we conclude that 
the sponsoring agency affects conformity. From Table 3 we note that 
being sponsored by NIH or NIMH is correlated with the “academic 
model.” The question is, what is it about NIH/NIMH sponsorship that 
might explain its correlation with conformity to methodological norms. 
First, at the time of our study, NIH/NIMH was the only agency that made 
extensive use of an external peer review system. Second, by its heavy 
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reliance on the open grant system, agency decisions to support proposed 
research were purportedly made on the basis of projected conformity to 
technical norms and evidence of ability to adhere to technical prescrip- 
tions. Third, the heavy reliance on the open grant system may have 
created a highly competitive system whereby only proposals evidencing 
merit of support would be funded. In terms of the use of an external peer 
review system, Polanyi (1951, pp. 65-66) and Price (1968) argue that the 
conferring of research support must remain in the hands of representa- 
tives of the scientific community if professional standards are to be 
maintained. Their argument is predicated on the assumption that scien- 
tists alone are competent to judge the viability of proposed work. In terms 
of the relationship between competition and conformity, Simmel(1955, p. 
60) and Hagstrom (1965, p. 39) note that competition is likely to increase 
commitment to norms and that the lack of it is likely to increase deviation. 
The nature of the award, a variable highly correlated with the sponsor- 
ing agency, has a substantial gross effect on conformity and one of the 
only two significant net effects (see Table 1). From Table 2 we note that 
evaluators funded under contract auspices are less likely to conform to 
technical norms than are those funded under grant auspices. This finding 
may be a function of the fact that grants and contracts can be differ- 
entiated according to (a) the degree of participation of representatives of 
the scientific community in decisions about which research to support, (b) 
the degree of autonomy afforded the researcher by virtue of the type of 
award,14 and/or (c) the degree of competition for receipt of the award. 
Grants tend to be allocated as the result of peer review: they are tra- 
ditionally awarded to researchers studying scientific problems identified 
and delimited $first by the researcher, and competition for them is quite 
extensive. Contracts, at the time of our study, were generally awarded not 
after peer review, but rather on the basis of decisions by funding agency 
staff, usually persons who were not formally credentialed representatives 
of the scientific community. Furthermore, contracts were usually 
awarded on an RFP system: thus, the research problem and design for 
execution were defined and initiated first by the funding officer rather than 
by the researcher. Last, partly because of the particular demands of 
contracts, e.g., time specifications, competition for contracts is limited to 
the very few persons and groups capable and willing to work under the 
specific terms of the award.15 
References for support of the finding that peer review in a competitive 
I4 By autonomy, we mean autonomy to define the research problem, delimit the scope of 
the problem, and select the methods by which to study the problem. 
I5 An additional difference between grants and contracts that we can assume to be 
present, but about which we have no evidence or data, is that persons may self-select 
themselves into those two categories on the basis of factors that may be related to our 
measure of conformity. For example, it may be that when a person has a clear research 
problem, with a good research plan, that person might apply for a grant: however, faced with 
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system is likely to increase conformity have already been cited. Regarding 
the relationship between autonomy and conformity, Polanyi (1951), Roe 
(1951), Whyte (1956), Kuhn (1962), Kornhauser (1962), Hagstrom (1965), 
Freidson (1970), and Zuckerman and Met-ton (1971) argue that autonomy 
is a primary incentive for conformity, and the lack of it a stimulus for 
deviation. 
Before turning to the next variable, an additional point needs to be 
made, i.e., that our data suggest that the presence of a peer review system 
is correlated with greater conformity. Table 5 presents a mean breakdown 
of scores on the index of conformity by agency and by nature of award. 
TABLE 5 
Mean Scores of Evaluation Researchers Receiving Grant or Contract Support 
from Federal Agencies on the Index of Conformity” 
Social Rehabilitation Services Office of Education, HUD, 
National Institutes of or Law Enforcement Agriculture, Labor, OEO, or 
Health/Mental Health Assistance Administration HEW other than NIMH/NIH 
or SRS 
4.62 (45) 4.04 (48) 3.51 (58) 
Grant Contract Grant Contract Grant Contract 
4.86 (40) 2.70 (5) 4.08 (42) 3.69 (6) 4.79 (7) 3.33 (51) 
0 NIH, NIMH, and Office of Education peer reviewed grants but not contracts in FY 1970. 
SRS, LEAA rarely used peer reviews on either grants or contracts in FY 1970. HUD, 
Agriculture, Labor, OEO, and HEW (other than SRS, NIH, NIMH) did not award any grants 
in FY 1970. Note: Overall mean is 4.0; SD is 1.4. 
Although the cells are small, the pattern seems clear. In funding agencies 
in which grants and contracts differed according to the presence or ab- 
sence of a peer review system, i.e., NIH/NJMH, persons receiving grants 
fared better on the index than did those receiving contracts. However, for 
agencies in which the grant and contract mechanisms did not differ, e.g., 
Social Rehabilitation Services, which at the time of our study made little 
or no use of peer review, regardless of whether the award was a grant or 
contract, we find no difference between persons supported under grant 
versus those supported under contract auspices. In view of the recent 
debates over peer review in Science (Gustafson, 1975), this seems impor- 
tant to note. 
The number of years allocated for the research significantly and 
a “murkier” research problem, and a research plan open to methodological criticism, that 
person might apply for a contract, hoping that the importance of the “murky” problem will 
outweigh the liabilities of the methodological inadequacies. Or, it may be that more 
methodologically sophisticated researchers apply for grants, while those with less methodo- 
logical skills apply for contracts. In the absence of data, we can only raise these issues as 
potentially relevant to understanding our own findings as well as important considerations 
for future research. 
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uniquely affects conformity (see Table 1). From Table 3 we conclude that 
evaluative researchers working under minimum-time constraints (3 years 
or more) are more likely to conform to technical norms. According to 
Parsons (1951, p. 335) and Kornhauser (1962, pp. 52-53), scientists gener- 
ally prefer work arrangements that allow for lengthy probes and the 
exhaustive testing of ideas. 
The type of organization has a significant gross effect on conformity 
(see Table 1). From Table 3 we note that being affiliated with educational 
institutions is a characteristic of the “academic model.” Thus, the ques- 
tion again is one of explaining what it is about educational institutions that 
might contribute to its correlation with conformity to methodological 
norms. Our contention is that educational institutions are most likely to 
define goals that are similar, if not identical, to the goals of the scientific 
community, e.g., publishing theoretically relevant, methodologically 
competent work. Moreover, in educational institutions, responsibility for 
work is usually allocated to particular individuals rather than to diffuse 
groups: and educational institutions are purportedly governed by col- 
league rather than hierarchical control. According to Parsons (1951), Orth 
(1959), Kornhauser (1962), and Hagstrom (1965), the university is the 
institution most likely to embody the norms of science. Furthermore, 
Hagstrom (1965) asserted that conformity to norms is most likely to occur 
when work responsibility is allocated specifically (to individuals) rather 
than diffusely (to groups), since only with specific responsibility can 
major rewards be obtained. Finally, Whyte (1965), Weinberg (1961), and 
Kornhauser (1962) suggest that conformity to scientific norms is more 
likely when the authority structure of the work organization is charac- 
terized by colleague rather than hierarchical control, since hierarchical 
control may lead to a redefinition of goals and the bases for rewards other 
than those ordinarily embraced by the scientific community, e.g., the goal 
of getting more research funds may replace the goal of conducting quality 
research. 
From Table 1 we note that the major audience has a significant gross 
effect, and from Table 3 we see that defining one’s major audience as 
cosmopolitanI is part of the “academic model.” For the group of 
evaluators (the cosmopolitans) who define other researchers and col- 
leagues as their major audience and who indicate that they have or will 
publish their findings in refereed journals and/or monographs, it is likely 
that they conform to technical norms because their reference group and 
the mode of dissemination they use (or seek to use) require such conform- 
ity. However, for the other evaluators (the locals), who define the 
government and public officials as their major audience, and who publish 
(or plan to publish) their findings in government publications or mimeo- 
I6 For a definition of the difference between “cosmopolitan” and “local,” see Footnote b 
on Table 2. 
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graphed organizational documents, their reference group and selected 
mode of dissemination do not require conformity to technical norms. As 
such, they are not motivated to do so or at least not by their reference 
group. 
The formal organizational arrangement between the evaluative re- 
searcher and the organization administering the action program being 
evaluated has a significant gross effect on conformity (see Table 1). 
According to Table 3, having an organizational affiliation the same as 
the organization administering the action program, i.e., being “inside,” is 
part of the academic model. (It is critical to note here that few “inside 
evaluators” are the same people as the administrators of the program being 
evaluated.)” The finding that being “inside” is part of the model type 
more highly correlated with conformity is particularly interesting in view 
of the fact that a review of evaluative research literature reveals very 
mixed support for the “inside” position (see Caro, 1971, p. 17). Argu- 
ments made in favor of insiders hypothesize that insiders will be better 
equipped to develop knowledge about and measurements for program 
process and program effectiveness, better able to do continuing research, 
have greater access to important data records, and be better able to mediate 
problems ensuing from practitioner-scientist research relationships. Ar- 
guments made in favor of outsiders hypothesize that outsiders will be 
better able to maintain objectivity, more able to include criteria that 
question organizational premises and effectiveness, better protected from 
problems of marginality and status incongruity, and better able to with- 
stand requests to engage in time-consuming nonresearch acts. We con- 
tend that the political liabilities of being outside may be so great so as to 
force evaluators to compromise scientific rigor in order to be able to 
execute some small part of the intended research. Argyris (1958), Angel1 
(1967), Aronson and Sherwood (1967), and Coleman (1971) have all ad- 
dressed the litany of complaints of evaluative researchers whose work has 
been compromised or thwarted by uncooperative social action staffs. 
Since this finding is somewhat unexpected, we will return to a further 
exploration of it shortly. 
” Bernstein and Freeman (1975) report that, of the 236 evaluation studies they reviewed, 
38% were conducted by evaluators working within the same organization as that administer- 
ing the social action program: 42% by evaluators working in partly or completely different 
organizations: 12% by evaluators working in different organizations where one organization 
was a subcontractor of the other: and 8% by evaluators who, along with the action staff 
administrators, were both separate subcontractors of a third organization. Of the 38% where 
the evaluation staff and action staff were part of the same organization, in only 25% of the 90 
cases was the evaluation staff the same person(s) as the staff administering the action 
program. Thus, only 9% were simultaneouslyprogramadministrators andevaluative research- 
ers. An example of an “inside evaluator” is a psychiatrist on the staff of Harvard who acts 
as the evaluator for a mental health program run out of the Harvard Medical Center. While 
the evaluator and the program administrator are both members of the same organization, 
their immediate work groups are quite distinct. 
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The working relationship between the evaluation staff and the action 
program staff vis-a-vis research decisions has a significant gross effect 
(see Table 1). From Table 3 we note that joint decisions made by the two 
staffs are correlated with the academic model. Freeman and Sherwood 
(1%5), Coleman (197 l), and Kellam (1973) state that the politically sensi- 
tive nature of conducting evaluative research makes it essential for the 
two groups to work jointly in making research decisions. Extensive con- 
sultation with the action program staff can provide access to essential data 
about program process and program goals, as well as serve as a vehicle for 
establishing a cooperative relationship between the two staffs. They 
suggest, too, that this cooperative working arrangement is more crucial 
when the evaluator is an “outside” evaluator. 
Because these last two variables are intercorrelated,18 and because the 
literature is so varied in terms of what is likely to correlate with conform- 
ity, we present Table 6 as an exploratory consideration of what might 
occur if we were to consider simultaneously the effects of these two 
variables on conformity.1g While the “inside” evaluative researcher fared 
better on conformity than the “outsider,” when inside, it seems less 
TABLE 6 
Mean Scores of Evaluation Researchers in Varied Formal Organizational 
Arrangements with Varied Informal Working Arrangements 
on the Index of Conformity” 
Inside Outside 
Evaluator and action staff in same Evaluator and action staff in different 
organization organizations 
4.55 (62) 3.63 (89) 
Research decisions Research decisions 
made inter- reviewed by or 
dependently with made independent 
action staff of action staff 
Research decisions Research decisions 
made inter- reviewed by or 
dependently with made independent 
action staff of action staff 
4.55 (48) 4.56 (14) 4.01 (19) 3.52 (70) 
a Note: Overall mean is 4.0; SD is 1.4. 
I8 The correlation between being inside and working interdependently is .56. The correla- 
tion between being outside and working interdependently is -60. The correlation between 
being outside and working independent of the action staff is .39. These three correlations are 
all significant at the ,001 level. 
I8 We say exploratory consideration because the small number of cases does not allow for 
a meaningful examination of this possible interaction effect. In spite of this, we did do a 
difference of means test: the differences were not statistically significant. 
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important that the two make research decisions interdependently. How- 
ever, when the evaluator was “outside,” it seemed that an interdependent 
(joint) working relationship vis&vis research decisions increased the 
likelihood of greater conformity. Both these findings suggest that what 
might be important is that the two groups have either some formal or 
informal arrangement so that cooperation can be facilitated and mecha- 
nisms for gaining access to the necessary information can be provided. 
Summarily, while the data don’t show a statistically significant interaction 
effect, such an effect might be demonstrable if one had a larger sample of 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In terms of Met-ton’s (1949) original question about the factors that 
make for achievement in applied social science, our data lead us to 
conclude that, (a) When the representatives of the scientific community 
are active participants in the decision-making process to award support to 
persons whose research proposal shows evidence of promise and compe- 
tence, and (b) when the award is made to persons presently members of 
educational institutions or the like, where there is likely support for 
scientific work that evidences methodological competence, and (c) when 
the researchers in accordance with the reward structure of the organiza- 
tion with which they are affiliated, define their major audience as includ- 
ing other members of the scientific community, and (d) when the re- 
searcher works cooperatively with the host agency in executing the re- 
search, there will be a greater likelihood of achievement in applied social 
science. Our assumption is that a prerequisite for achievement is adher- 
ence to methodological norms. 
In terms of the Hagstrom question about external influences and their 
effect on applied scientists, our data suggest that not only are external 
factors affecting scientists’ behavior, at least the degree to which they 
adhere to technical norms, but also, our comparison of the academic 
versus entrepreneurial types suggests that as the input of nonscientists 
increases, so does the likelihood of their influence having a negative 
impact on conformity to technical norms increase. 
In terms of the implications for social policy, our exploratory findings 
raise two immediate questions. First, given that the input of nonscientists 
is increasing, what are the conditions under which one can translate that 
input into an effect positively correlated with adherence to methodologi- 
cal norms. Second, given that the entrepreneurial model is likely to 
dominate in applied social science research, what mechanisms of social 
control can be introduced to increase conformity to methodological norms 
within the entrepreneurial model. Both these questions make obvious the 
fact that further research is needed before we can begin to delimit a model 
for structuring the organization of applied research conducive to the 
production of quality work. 
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